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Divorcing Money 
from Monetary Policy
1.I n t r o d u c t i o n
onetary policy has traditionally been viewed as the
 process by which a central bank uses its influence over 
the supply of money to promote its economic objectives. For 
example, Milton Friedman (1959, p. 24) defined the tools of 
monetary policy to be those “powers that enable the [Federal 
Reserve] System to determine the total amount of money in 
existence or to alter that amount.” In fact, the very term 
monetary policy suggests a central bank’s policy toward the 
supply of money or the level of some monetary aggregate.
In recent decades, however, central banks have moved away 
from a direct focus on measures of the money supply. The 
primary focus of monetary policy has instead become the value 
of a short-term interest rate. In the United States, for example, 
the Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) announces a rate that it wishes to prevail in the federal 
funds market, where overnight loans are made among 
commercial banks. The tools of monetary policy are then used 
to guide the market interest rate toward the chosen target. For 
this reason, we follow the common practice of using the term 
monetary policy to refer to a central bank’s interest rate policy.
It is important to realize, however, that the quantity of 
money and monetary policy remain fundamentally linked 
under this approach. Commercial banks hold money in the 
form of reserve balances at the central bank; these balances 
are used to meet reserve requirements and make interbank 
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• Many central banks operate in a way that 
creates a tight link between money and 
monetary policy, as the supply of reserves 
must be set precisely in order to implement 
the target interest rate. 
￿ Because reserves play other key roles in the 
economy, this link can generate tensions with 
central banks’ other objectives, particularly 
in periods of acute market stress.
￿ An alternative approach to monetary policy 
implementation can eliminate the tension 
between money and monetary policy 
by “divorcing” the quantity of reserves 
from the interest rate target.
￿ By paying interest on reserve balances at 
its target interest rate, a central bank can 
increase the supply of reserves without 
driving market interest rates below the target.
￿ This “floor-system” approach allows the 
central bank to set the supply of reserve 
balances according to the payment or 
liquidity needs of financial markets while 
simultaneously encouraging the efficient 
allocation of resources.42 Divorcing Money from Monetary Policy
payments. The quantity of reserve balances demanded by 
banks varies inversely with the short-term interest rate because 
this rate represents the opportunity cost of holding reserves. 
The central bank aims to manipulate the supply of reserve 
balances—for example, through open market operations that 
exchange reserve balances for bonds—so that the marginal 
value of a unit of reserves to the banking sector equals the target 
interest rate. The interbank market for short-term funds will 
then clear with most trades taking place at or near the target 
rate. In other words, the quantity of money (especially reserve 
balances) is chosen by the central bank in order to achieve its 
interest rate target. 
This link between money and monetary policy can generate 
tension with central banks’ other objectives because bank 
reserves play other important roles in the economy. In 
particular, reserve balances are used to make interbank 
payments; thus, they serve as the final form of settlement for 
a vast array of transactions. The quantity of reserves needed for 
payment purposes typically far exceeds the quantity consistent 
with the central bank’s desired interest rate. As a result, central 
banks must perform a balancing act, drastically increasing the 
supply of reserves during the day for payment purposes 
through the provision of daylight reserves (also called daylight 
credit) and then shrinking the supply back at the end of the day 
to be consistent with the desired market interest rate.
Recent experience has shown that central banks perform 
this balancing act well most of the time. Nevertheless, it is 
important to understand the tension between the daylight and 
overnight need for reserves and the potential problems that 
may arise. One concern is that central banks typically provide 
daylight reserves by lending directly to banks, which may 
expose the central bank to substantial credit risk. Such lending 
may also generate moral hazard problems and exacerbate the 
too-big-to-fail problem, whereby regulators would be reluctant 
to close a financially troubled bank.
The tension is clearest during times of acute stress in 
financial markets. In the days following September 11, 2001, 
for example, the Federal Reserve provided an unusually large 
quantity of reserves in order to promote the efficient 
functioning of the payments system and financial markets 
more generally. As a result of this action, the fed funds rate 
fell substantially below the target level for several days.1 
During the financial turmoil that began in August 2007, the 
tension was much longer lasting. Sharp increases in spreads 
between the yields on liquid and illiquid assets indicated a 
classic liquidity shortage: an increased demand for liquid assets 
relative to their illiquid counterparts. By increasing the supply 
of the most liquid asset in the economy—bank reserves—the 
Federal Reserve could likely have eased the shortage and helped 
push spreads back toward more normal levels. Doing so, 
however, would have driven the market interest rate below the 
FOMC’s target rate and thus interfered with monetary policy 
objectives. Instead, the Federal Reserve developed new, indirect 
methods of supplying liquid assets to the private sector, 
such as providing loans of Treasury securities against less liquid 
collateral through the Term Securities Lending Facility. 
Recently, attention has turned to an alternative approach 
to monetary policy implementation that has the potential to 
eliminate the basic tension between money and monetary 
policy by effectively “divorcing” the quantity of reserves from 
the interest rate target. The basic idea behind this approach 
is to remove the opportunity cost to commercial banks of 
holding reserve balances by paying interest on these balances 
at the prevailing target rate. Under this system, the interest rate 
paid on reserves forms a floor below which the market rate 
cannot fall. The supply of reserves could therefore be increased 
substantially without moving the short-term interest rate away 
from its target. Such an increase could be used to provide 
liquidity during times of stress or to reduce the need for 
daylight credit on a regular basis.2 A particular version of the 
“floor-system” approach has recently been adopted by the 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
It should be noted that adopting a floor-system approach 
requires the central bank to pay interest on reserves, something 
1 Intraday volatility of the fed funds rate remained high, with trades being 
executed far from the target rate, for several weeks. See McAndrews and Potter 
(2002) and Martin (forthcoming) for detailed discussions.
2 This approach has been advocated in various forms by Woodford (2000), 
Goodfriend (2002), Lacker (2006), and Whitesell (2006b).
[The] link between money and monetary 
policy can generate tension with central 
banks’ other objectives because bank 
reserves play other important roles 
in the economy.
It is important to understand the tension 
between the daylight and overnight need 
for reserves and the potential problems 
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the Federal Reserve has historically lacked authorization to do. 
However, the Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006 
will give the Federal Reserve, for the first time, explicit authority 
to pay interest on reserve balances, beginning on October 1, 
2011. A floor system will therefore soon be a feasible option 
for monetary policy implementation in the United States.
In this article, we present a simple, graphical model of the 
monetary policy implementation process to show how the 
floor system divorces money from monetary policy. Our aim 
is to present the fundamental ideas in a way that is accessible 
to a broad audience. Section 2 describes the process by which 
monetary policy is currently implemented in the United States 
and in other countries. Section 3 discusses the tensions that can 
arise in this framework between monetary policy and 
payments/liquidity policy. Section 4 illustrates how the floor 
system works; it also discusses potential issues associated with 
adopting this type of system in a large economy such as the 
United States. Section 5 concludes.
2.A n  O v e r v i e w  o f  M o n e t a r y  P o l i c y
Implementation
In this section, we describe a stylized model of the process 
through which many of the world’s central banks implement 
monetary policy. Our model focuses on the relationship 
between the demand for reserve balances and the interest rate 
in the interbank market for overnight loans. Following Poole 
(1968), a variety of papers have developed formal models of 
portfolio choice by individual banks and derived the resulting 
aggregate demand for reserves.3 Our graphical model of 
aggregate reserve demand is consistent with these more formal 
approaches. We first discuss the system currently used in the 
United States and then describe a symmetric channel system, 
as used by a number of other central banks.
2.1 Monetary Policy Implementation 
in the United States
We begin by examining the total demand for reserve balances 
by the U.S. banking system. In our stylized framework, this 
demand is generated by a combination of two factors. First, 
banks face reserve requirements. If a bank’s final balance is 
3 Recent contributions include Furfine (2000), Guthrie and Wright (2000), 
Bartolini, Bertola, and Prati (2002), Clouse and Dow (2002), Whitesell (2006a, b), 
and Ennis and Weinberg (2007).
smaller than its requirement, it pays a penalty that is 
proportional to the shortfall. Second, banks experience 
unanticipated late-day payment flows into and out of their 
reserve account after the interbank market has closed. A bank’s 
final reserve balance, therefore, may be either higher or lower 
than the quantity of reserves it chooses to hold in the interbank 
market. This uncertainty makes it difficult for a bank to satisfy 
its requirement exactly and generates a “precautionary” 
demand for reserves.
For simplicity, we abstract from a number of features of 
reality that, while important, are not essential to understanding 
the basic framework. For example, we assume that reserve 
requirements must be met on a daily basis, rather than on 
average over a two-week reserve maintenance period. 
Alternatively, one can interpret our model as applying to 
average reserve balances (and the average overnight interest 
rate) over a maintenance period. In addition, we do not 
explicitly include vault cash in the analysis, using the terms 
reserve balances and reserves interchangeably.4
Exhibit 1 presents the aggregate demand for reserves in our 
framework. The horizontal axis measures the total quantity of 
reserve balances held by banks while the vertical axis measures 
the market interest rate for overnight loans of these balances. 
The penalty rate labeled on the vertical axis represents the 
interest rate a bank pays if it must borrow funds at the end of 
4 Required reserves should therefore be interpreted as a bank’s requirement 
net of its vault cash holdings. To the extent that vault cash holdings are 
independent of the overnight rate, at least over short horizons, including them 
in our model would have no effect. We also abstract from the Contractual 
Clearing Balance program, which allows banks to earn credit for priced services 
at the Federal Reserve by holding a contractually agreed amount of reserves in 
excess of their requirement; these contractual arrangements, once set, act much 
like reserves requirements.44 Divorcing Money from Monetary Policy
the period to meet its requirement. One can interpret this 
penalty rate as the interest rate charged at the Federal Reserve’s 
primary credit facility (the discount window), adjusted by any 
“stigma” costs that banks perceive to be associated with 
borrowing at this facility. The important feature of the penalty 
rate is that it lies above the FOMC’s target interest rate.5
To explain the shape of the demand curve in the exhibit, we 
ask: given a particular value for the interest rate, what quantity 
of reserve balances would banks demand to hold if that rate 
prevailed in the interbank market? First, note that if the market 
interest rate were above the penalty rate, there would be an 
arbitrage opportunity: banks could borrow reserves at the 
(lower) penalty rate and lend them at the (higher) market 
interest rate. If the market interest rate were exactly equal to 
the penalty rate, however, banks would be willing to hold some 
reserve balances toward meeting their requirements. In fact, 
each bank would be indifferent between holding reserves 
directly and borrowing at the penalty rate as long as it is sure 
that late-day payment inflows will not leave it holding excess 
balances at the end of the day. As a result, the demand curve 
is flat—reflecting this indifference—at the level of the penalty 
rate for sufficiently small levels of reserve balances.
For interest rates below the penalty rate, each bank will 
choose to hold a quantity of reserves that is close to the level of 
its requirement; hence, aggregate reserve demand will be close 
to the total level of required reserves. However, as described 
above, banks face uncertainty about their final account balance 
that prevents them from being able to meet their requirement 
exactly. Instead, each bank must balance the possibility of 
falling short of its requirement—and being forced to pay the 
5 The interest rate charged on discount window loans has been set above the 
FOMC’s target rate since the facility was redesigned in 2003. The gap between 
the two rates was initially set at 100 basis points, but has since been lowered 
to 50 basis points (in August 2007) and to 25 basis points (in March 2008). 
In addition, there is evidence that banks attach a substantial nonpecuniary cost 
to borrowing from the discount window, as they sometimes borrow in the 
interbank market at interest rates significantly higher than the discount 
window rate. These stigma costs may reflect a fear that other market 
participants will find out about the loan and interpret it as a sign of financial 
weakness on the part of the borrowing bank.
penalty rate—against the possibility that it will end up holding 
more reserves than are required. As no interest is paid on 
reserves, holding excess balances is also costly. The resulting 
demand for reserve balances will vary inversely with the market 
interest rate, since this rate represents the opportunity cost of 
holding reserves. The less expensive it is to hold precautionary 
reserve balances, the greater the quantity demanded by the 
banking system will be. This reasoning generates the 
downward-sloping part of the demand curve in the exhibit.
If the market interest rate were very low—close to zero—the 
opportunity cost of holding reserves would be very small. In 
this case, each bank would hold enough precautionary reserves 
to be virtually certain that unforeseen payment flows will not 
decrease its reserve balance below the required level. In other 
words, each bank would choose to be “fully insured” against 
the possibility of falling short of its requirements. The point in 
Exhibit 1 where the demand curve intersects the horizontal axis 
represents the total of this fully insured quantity of reserve 
balances for all banks. The banking system will not demand 
more than this quantity of reserve balances as long as there 
is some opportunity cost, no matter how small, of holding 
these reserves.
If the market interest rate were exactly zero, however, there 
would be no opportunity cost of holding reserves. In this 
limiting case, there is no cost at all to a bank of holding 
additional reserves above the fully insured amount. The 
demand curve is therefore flat along the horizontal axis after 
this point; banks are indifferent between any quantities of 
reserves above the fully insured amount when the market 
interest rate is exactly zero.
Needless to say, our model of reserve demand abstracts 
from important features of reality. Holding more reserves, 
for example, might require a bank to raise more deposits and 
subject it to higher capital requirements. Nevertheless, the 
model is useful because it lays out, in perhaps the simplest way 
possible, the basic relationship between the market interest rate 
and the demand for reserves that results from the optimal 
portfolio decisions of banks. Moreover, small changes in the 
shape of the demand curve would have no material effect on 
the analysis that follows.
The equilibrium interest rate in our model is determined by 
the height of the demand curve at the level of reserve balances 
supplied by the Federal Reserve. If the supply is smaller than 
the total amount of required reserves, for example, the 
equilibrium interest rate would be near the penalty rate. If, 
however, the supply of reserves were very large, the equilibrium 
interest rate would be zero. Between these two extremes, on 
the downward-sloping portion of the demand curve, there 
is a liquidity effect of reserve balances on the market interest 
The . . . demand for reserve balances will 
vary inversely with the market interest 
rate, since this rate represents the 
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rate: a higher supply of reserves will lower the equilibrium 
interest rate.6
As shown in the exhibit, there is a unique level of reserve 
supply that will lead the market to clear at the FOMC’s 
announced target rate; we call this level the target supply. 
Monetary policy is implemented through open market 
operations that aim to set the supply of reserves to this target 
level. This process requires the Fed’s Open Market Desk to 
accurately forecast both reserve demand and changes in the 
existing supply of reserves attributable to autonomous factors 
such as payments into and out of the Treasury’s account. 
Forecasting errors will lead the actual supply to deviate from 
the target and, hence, will cause the market interest rate to 
differ from the target rate. In our simple model, the downward-
sloping portion of the demand curve may be quite steep, 
indicating that relatively small forecasting errors could lead 
to substantial interest rate volatility. In reality, a variety of 
institutional arrangements, including reserve maintenance 
periods, are designed to flatten this curve and thus limit the 
volatility associated with forecasting errors.7 
The key point of this discussion is that monetary policy is 
implemented in the United States by changing the supply of 
reserves in such a way that the fed funds market will clear at 
the desired rate. In other words, the stock of “money” is set in 
order to achieve a monetary policy objective. This direct 
relationship between money and monetary policy generates 
the tensions that we discuss in Section 3. 
6 See Hamilton (1997), Carpenter and Demiralp (2006a), and Thornton (2006) 
for empirical evidence of this liquidity effect.
7 See Ennis and Keister (2008) for a detailed discussion of interest rate volatility 
in this basic framework. See Whitesell (2006a) for a formal model of the 
“flattening” effect of reserve maintenance periods.
2.2 Symmetric Channel Systems
Many central banks use what is known as a symmetric channel 
(or corridor) system for monetary policy implementation. Such 
systems are used, for example, by the European Central Bank 
(ECB) and by the central banks of Australia, Canada, England, 
and (until spring 2006) New Zealand. The key features of a 
symmetric channel system are standing central bank facilities 
that lend to and accept deposits from commercial banks. The 
lending facility resembles the discount window in the United 
States; banks are permitted to borrow freely (with acceptable 
collateral) at an interest rate that is a fixed number of basis 
points above the target rate. The deposit facility allows banks 
to earn overnight interest on their excess reserve holdings at a 
rate that is the same number of basis points below the target. 
In this way, the interest rates at the two standing facilities form 
a “channel” around the target rate.
Exhibit 2 depicts the demand for reserve balances in a 
symmetric channel system. The curve looks very similar to that 
in Exhibit 1. There is no demand for reserves in the interbank 
market if the interest rate is higher than the rate at the lending 
facility.8 For lower values of the market rate, the demand is 
decreasing in the interest rate—and hence the liquidity effect is 
present—for exactly the same reasons as before. Banks choose 
their reserve holdings to balance the potential costs of falling 
short of their requirement against the potential costs of ending 
with excess reserves. When the opportunity cost of holding 
reserves is lower, banks’ precautionary demand for reserves will 
be larger.
8 The lending facility in a channel system is typically designed in a way that aims 
to minimize stigma effects. For this reason, we begin the demand curve in 
Exhibit 2 at the lending rate instead of at a penalty rate that includes stigma 
effects, as was the case in Exhibit 1.
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Monetary policy is implemented in the 
United States by changing the supply of 
reserves in such a way that the fed funds 
market will clear at the desired rate. 
In other words, the stock of “money” 
is set in order to achieve a monetary 
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The new feature in Exhibit 2 is that the demand curve does 
not decrease all the way to the horizontal axis, but instead 
becomes flat at the deposit rate. In other words, the deposit 
rate forms a floor below which the demand curve will not fall. 
If the market rate were below the deposit rate, an arbitrage 
opportunity would exist—a bank could borrow at the (low) 
market rate and earn the (higher) deposit rate on these funds, 
making a pure profit. The demand for reserves would be 
unbounded in this case; such arbitrage activity would quickly 
drive up the market rate until it at least equals the deposit rate.
The demand curve is flat at the deposit rate for the same 
reason it was flat on the horizontal axis in Exhibit 1. If the 
market rate were exactly equal to the deposit rate, banks would 
face no opportunity cost of holding excess reserves. Holding 
additional funds on deposit and lending them would yield 
exactly the same return. Banks would therefore be indifferent 
between any quantities of reserves above the fully insured 
amount. In other words, paying interest on excess reserves 
raises the floor where the demand curve is flat from an interest 
rate of zero (as in Exhibit 1) to the deposit rate (as in Exhibit 2).
The equilibrium interest rate is determined exactly as 
before, by the height of the demand curve at the level of reserve 
balances supplied by the central bank. Monetary policy is thus 
implemented in much the same way as it is in the United States. 
The target interest rate determines, through the demand curve, 
a target supply of reserves, and the central bank aims to change 
total reserve supply to bring it as close as possible to this target. 
Importantly, the link between money and monetary policy 
remains: the quantity of reserves is set in order to achieve the 
desired interest rate.
The symmetric channel systems used by various central 
banks differ in a variety of important details. The Bank of 
England and the ECB operate relatively wide channels, with the 
standing facility rates 100 basis points on either side of the 
target. Australia and Canada, in contrast, operate narrow 
channels, where this figure is only 25 basis points. Australia and 
Canada have no required reserves; in this case, the demand 
curve in Exhibit 2 shifts to the left so that the “required 
reserves” line lies on the vertical axis. The important point 
here, however, is that regardless of these operational details, a 
symmetric channel system links the quantity of reserves to the 
central bank’s interest rate target, exactly as in the U.S. system. 
3. Payments, Liquidity Services, 
and Reserves
The link between money and monetary policy described above 
can generate tension with central banks’ other objectives, 
particularly those regarding the payments system and the 
provision of liquidity. Reserve balances are useful to banks, 
and to the financial system more generally, for purposes other 
than simply meeting reserve requirements. Banks use reserve 
balances to provide valuable payment services to depositors. 
In addition, these balances assist the financial sector in 
allocating other, less liquid assets. Since reserves are a 
universally accepted asset, they can be exchanged more easily 
for other assets than any substitute. Finally, reserve balances 
serve as a perfectly liquid, risk-free store of value, which is 
particularly useful during times of market turmoil. Because 
reserves play these other important roles, the quantity of 
reserve balances consistent with the central bank’s monetary 
policy objective may at times come into conflict with the 
quantity that is desirable for other purposes. In this section, 
we describe some of the tensions that can arise.
3.1 Payments Policy
The value of the payments made during the day in a central 
bank’s large-value payments system is typically far greater than 
the level of reserve balances held by banks overnight. (In the 
United States, for example, during the first quarter of 2008 the 
average daily value of transactions over the Fedwire Funds 
Service was approximately 185 times the value of banks’ total 
balances on deposit at the Federal Reserve.) The discrepancy 
has widened in recent decades as most central banks have 
adopted a real-time gross settlement (RTGS) design for their 
large-value payments system, which requires substantially 
larger payment flows than earlier designs based on netting of 
payment values.9
As a result, banks’ overnight reserve holdings are too small 
to allow for the smooth functioning of the payments system 
9 See Bech and Hobijn (2007) for an analysis of the adoption of RTGS systems 
by various central banks.
[In a symmetric channel system,] the 
target interest rate determines, through 
the demand curve, a target supply of 
reserves, and the central bank aims to 
change total reserve supply to bring
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during the day. When reserves are scarce or costly during the 
day, banks must expend resources in carefully coordinating the 
timing of their payments. If banks delay sending payments to 
economize on scarce reserves, the risk of an operational failure 
or gridlock in the payments system tends to increase. The 
combination of limited overnight reserve balances and the 
much larger daylight demand for reserves thus creates tension 
between a central bank’s monetary policy and its payments 
policy. The central bank would like to increase the total supply 
of reserve balances for payment purposes, but doing so would 
interfere with its monetary policy objectives.
This tension has led to a common practice among central 
banks of supplying additional reserves to the banking system 
for a limited time during the day. These daylight reserves (also 
called daylight credit) are typically lent directly to banks. Many 
central banks provide daylight reserves against collateral at no 
cost to banks. The Federal Reserve currently supplies daylight 
credit to banks on an uncollateralized basis for a small fee.10 
In providing daylight reserves, a central bank aims to allow 
banks to make their payments during the day smoothly and 
efficiently while limiting its own exposure to credit risk.
Under normal circumstances, this process of expanding 
the supply of reserves during the day and shrinking it back 
overnight works well; banks make payments smoothly and the 
central bank implements its target interest rate. However, this 
balancing act is not without costs. Lending large quantities of 
reserves to banks each day exposes the central bank to credit 
risk. While requiring collateral for these loans mitigates credit 
risk, it is an imperfect solution. If collateral is costly for banks 
to hold or create, the requirement imposes real costs. 
10 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2008b) for a proposal 
to change the Federal Reserve’s method of supplying daylight reserves. Under 
this proposal, banks would be able to obtain daylight reserves either on a 
collateralized basis at no cost or on an uncollateralized basis for a higher fee. 
For a general discussion of the Federal Reserve’s policies on daylight credit, 
see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2007). 
Moreover, collateralizing daylight loans simply moves the 
central bank’s claims ahead of the deposit insurance fund in the 
event of a bank failure, without necessarily reducing the overall 
risk of the consolidated public sector. 
Routine daylight lending by the central bank may also create 
moral hazard problems, leading banks to hold too little 
liquidity and, perhaps, take on too much risk. In addition, such 
lending might make regulators more reluctant to close a 
financially troubled bank promptly, exacerbating the well-
known too-big-to-fail problem. Even if each of these costs 
is relatively small in normal times, their sum should be 
considered part of the tension generated by the link between 
money and monetary policy.
3.2 Liquidity Policy
In times of stress or crisis in financial markets, the tension 
between monetary policy and central banks’ other objectives 
can become acute. After the destructive events of September 11, 
2001, the Federal Reserve recognized that the quantity of 
overnight reserves consistent with the target fed funds rate was 
too small to adequately address banks’ reluctance to make 
payments in a timely manner. The FOMC released a statement 
on September 17, 2001, that, in addition to lowering the target 
fed funds rate, stated: 
The Federal Reserve will continue to supply unusually 
large volumes of liquidity to the financial markets, 
as needed, until more normal market functioning is 
restored. As a consequence, the FOMC recognizes that 
the actual federal funds rate may be below its target 
on occasion in these unusual circumstances.11
In this statement, the FOMC explicitly recognized the tension 
between maintaining the market interest rate at its target level 
and supplying more reserves to meet the demand for financial 
market settlements. On September 18 and 19, the effective fed 
funds rate was close to 1¼ percent while the target rate was 
3 percent. 
Exhibit 1 is again useful to help illustrate what happened. 
To meet the demand for reserves for financial settlements in 
various markets, the Fed increased the supply of reserve 
balances. A shift in the supply curve to the right implies that 
intersection with the demand curve will occur at a lower 
interest rate.12 In this case, it was not possible to achieve 
simultaneously the interest rate target and the increase in 
overnight reserves necessary to ensure the efficient functioning 
11 See <http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/general/2001/
20010917>.
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of financial markets in conditions of stress. The exact same 
tension would arise under a symmetric channel system. Note, 
however, that the channel places a limit on how far the market 
interest rate can deviate from the target—it cannot fall below 
the deposit rate.
During the events of September 2001, the fed funds rate was 
below its target for only a few days and thus likely had no 
impact on monetary policy objectives, as expectations were 
that the target rate would quickly be reestablished. It is an 
instructive episode, however, in that it demonstrates how 
increasing the supply of reserve balances available to the 
banking system can support market liquidity, and how this 
objective can interfere with the maintenance of the target 
interest rate. 
The Federal Reserve faced a different type of liquidity issue 
during the financial market turmoil that began in August 2007. 
In this case, there was a sharp decline in what Goodfriend 
(2002) calls broad liquidity: the ease with which assets in general 
can be sold or used as collateral at a price that appropriately 
reflects the expected value of the asset’s future dividends. 
Goodfriend argues that increasing the supply of bank reserves 
can also support the level of broad liquidity in financial 
markets. This is especially true if the central bank uses the 
newly created reserves to purchase (or lend against) relatively 
illiquid assets, thereby increasing the total quantity of liquid 
assets held by the private sector. However, once again the link 
between money and monetary policy generates a tension; the 
central bank cannot pursue an independent “liquidity policy” 
using bank reserves. Any attempt to increase reserve balances 
12 Needless to say, the disruption in financial markets would also tend to 
increase the demand for reserves, shifting the curve in Exhibit 1 to the right. 
The FOMC’s statement indicates a desire to more than compensate for this 
shift, that is, to increase reserve supply beyond the point that would maintain 
the target interest rate given the increased reserve demand.
for the purpose of providing additional liquidity would lead to 
a lower short-term interest rate and, hence, would change the 
stance of monetary policy. 
Goodfriend (2002, p. 4) points out that central banks can 
use other, less direct methods of managing broad liquidity:
To some degree, the Fed can already manage broad 
liquidity under current operating procedures by changing 
the composition of its assets, for example, by selling liquid 
short-term Treasury securities and acquiring less liquid 
longer term securities. However, the government debt 
injected into the economy in this way would not be as 
liquid as newly created base money. More importantly, 
the Fed’s ability to affect broad liquidity in this way is 
strictly limited by the size of its balance sheet. 
Interestingly, one of the new facilities introduced by the Fed in 
response to the market turmoil closely resembled the policy 
described by Goodfriend. The Term Securities Lending 
Facility, introduced in March 2008, provides loans of Treasury 
securities using less liquid assets as collateral.13 These loans 
increase broad liquidity by raising the total supply of highly 
liquid assets (reserves plus Treasury securities) in the hands of 
the private sector and decreasing the supply of less liquid assets. 
However, as Goodfriend observes, the amount of broad 
liquidity that can be provided through such a facility is strictly 
limited by the quantity of Treasury securities owned by the 
central bank. Thus, while a central bank can pursue a policy 
based on changes in the composition of its assets, such a policy 
has inherent limitations. As we discuss in Section 4, alternative 
methods of monetary policy implementation allow the central 
bank to overcome this limitation by pursuing a liquidity policy 
based directly on bank reserves.
3.3 Efficient Allocation of Resources
Another tension generated by the typical methods of monetary 
policy implementation described earlier relates to efficiency 
concerns. These methods rely on banks facing an opportunity 
cost of holding reserves; their balances earn no interest in the 
U.S. system and earn less than the prevailing market rate in a 
symmetric corridor. This opportunity cost helps generate the 
downward-sloping part of the demand curve that the central 
bank uses to implement its target interest rate. The fact that
13 The Fed also introduced other facilities, including the Term Auction Facility 
and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility. Those facilities make loans of reserve 
balances. In order to maintain the target interest rate, however, the Fed uses 
open market operations to “sterilize” these loans, leaving the total supply of 
reserve balances unaffected.
The Federal Reserve faced a different 
type of liquidity issue during the 
financial market turmoil that began in 
August 2007. In this case, there was 
a sharp decline in . . . broad liquidity: 
the ease with which assets in general 
can be sold or used as collateral at a price 
that appropriately reflects the expected 
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holding reserves is costly, however, conflicts with another 
central bank objective: the desire to promote the efficient 
functioning of financial markets and the efficient allocation 
of resources more generally.
Remunerating reserve balances at a below-market interest 
rate is effectively a tax on holding these balances. (Box 1 
discusses how this tax is distortionary when applied to required 
reserves.) Similar logic shows that a distortion arises when 
banks face an opportunity cost of holding excess reserves. 
In this case, the tax leads banks to invest real resources in 
economizing on their holdings of excess reserves, but these 
efforts produce no social benefit. 
Reserve balances are costless for a central bank to create 
through open market operations, for example, that exchange 
newly created reserves for Treasury securities. If banks perceive 
an opportunity cost of holding reserves (relative to Treasury 
securities, say), then they will engage in socially inefficient 
efforts to reduce their use of reserves. In other words, the tax 
places a wedge between a private marginal rate of substitution 
and the corresponding social marginal rate of transformation. 
This type of distortion was emphasized by Friedman (1959, pp. 
71-5), who argues that the central bank should pay interest on 
all reserve balances at the prevailing market interest rate.14
One might be tempted to suppose that the distortions 
created by this tax must be small because the quantity of excess 
reserves held by banks is currently fairly small in the United 
States, around $1.5 billion. Such a conclusion is not warranted, 
however: the fact that the tax base is small does not imply that 
the deadweight loss associated with the tax is insignificant. The 
deadweight loss includes all efforts banks expend to avoid 
holding excess reserves, including closely monitoring end-of-
day and end-of-maintenance-period balances so that any 
14 This logic is central to the well-known Friedman rule, which calls for the 
central bank to eliminate the opportunity cost of holding all types of money 
(see especially Friedman [1969]). One way to implement this rule is by 
engineering a deflation that makes the real return on holding currency equal to 
the risk-free return. In this case, no interest needs to be paid on any form of 
money; the deflation generates the required positive return. In practice, there 
are a variety of concerns about deflation that keep central banks from following 
this approach. When applied to the narrower question of reserve balances held 
at the central bank, however, Friedman’s logic simply calls for remunerating all 
reserve balances at the risk-free rate.
Another tension generated by the 
typical methods of monetary policy 




Although this article emphasizes the similarities in monetary 
policy implementation procedures across countries, there are a 
number of differences. One notable difference is in the use of 
reserve requirements. Banks in the United States and the Euro zone 
are required to hold reserves in proportion to certain liabilities. In 
other countries, including Australia and Canada, banks are not 
required to hold any reserves; the only requirement is that a bank’s 
reserve account not be in overdraft at the end of the day.
In the simple framework we describe, it is immaterial whether 
banks face a positive reserve requirement or the requirement is 
effectively zero. In reality, however, there are important differences 
between these approaches. One such difference is that reserve 
requirements allow the central bank to implement reserve 
averaging, whereby banks are allowed to meet their requirement 
on average over a reserve maintenance period rather than every 
day. As shown in Whitesell (2006a), reserve averaging tends to 
flatten the demand curve for reserves around the central bank’s 
target supply on all days of a maintenance period except the last 
one; this flattening tends to reduce volatility in the market interest 
rate.a Another important difference is the extent of the distortions 
associated with bank reserve holdings. When required reserve 
balances do not earn interest, as is currently the case in the United 
States, the requirement acts as a tax on banks. This reserve tax raises 
banks’ operating costs and drives a wedge between the price of 
banking services and the social cost of producing those services, 
creating a deadweight loss. The reserve tax also gives banks a strong 
incentive to find ways to decrease their requirements, such as by 
sweeping customers’ checking account balances on a daily basis 
into other accounts not subject to reserve requirements. The 
efforts invested in these reserve-avoidance activities are clearly 
wasted from a social point of view.
Paying interest on required reserves at the prevailing market 
rate of interest, as the European Central Bank does, eliminates 
most of these distortions. The Bank of England goes a step further 
by having banks set voluntary balance targets. Once set, these 
targets can be used to implement monetary policy exactly the same 
way that reserve requirements are. However, because the targets 
are chosen by the individual banks, rather than being determined 
administratively, their creation generates none of the distortions 
associated with traditional reserve requirements.
a See Ennis and Keister (2008) for a detailed discussion of reserve 
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excess funds can be lent out, as well as actually lending the 
funds out. A substantial fraction of activity in the fed funds 
market is precisely of this type, and it is not clear whether 
these indirect costs associated with the tax are small.
The issues created by the reserve tax are sometimes 
described as a “hot potato” problem. Participants all try to get 
rid of excess reserves because holding them is costly. However, 
the supply of excess reserve balances is fixed by the central bank 
and, at any point in time, someone must be holding them. 
Extending this analogy a bit, the fact that the potato itself (that 
is, the quantity of excess reserve balances) is small does not 
imply that that the efforts spent passing it along are also small. 
This is especially true if the potato is very hot, that is, if excess 
reserve balances earn much less than the market rate of interest. 
Lucas (2000, p. 247) describes the deadweight loss associated 
with the inflation tax in a similar way:
In a monetary economy, it is in everyone’s private interest 
to try to get someone else to hold non-interest-bearing 
cash and reserves. But someone has to hold it all, so all 
of these efforts must simply cancel out. All of us spend 
several hours per year in this effort, and we employ 
thousands of talented and highly trained people to help 
us. These person-hours are simply thrown away, wasted 
on a task that should not have to be performed at all.
Any system of monetary policy implementation that relies 
on banks facing an opportunity cost of holding reserves 
necessarily creates deadweight losses. The approaches 
described in the previous section thus conflict with a central 
bank’s desire to promote an efficient allocation of resources 
in the economy.
We summarize by noting that a central bank’s payments 
policy, liquidity policy, and desire to promote efficient 
allocation may all come into conflict with its monetary policy 
objectives. The tension created by these conflicts tends to be 
particularly strong during periods of stress in financial 
markets. These tensions would be reduced or would disappear 
altogether if banks did not face an opportunity cost of holding 
overnight reserves that leads them to economize on their 
holdings. In the next section, we describe an approach to 
implementing monetary policy that removes this opportunity 
cost and discuss some of its implications.
4. Divorcing Money 
from Monetary Policy
The tensions we described all arise from the fact that, under 
either current U.S. practice or a symmetric channel system, the 
quantity of reserve balances must be set to a particular level in 
order for the central bank’s interest rate target to be achieved. 
There are, however, other approaches to monetary policy 
implementation in which this strict link between money and 
monetary policy is not present. Here we discuss one such 
approach, which can be described as a floor-target channel 
system, or simply a floor system. This approach is a modified 
version of the channel system described above and has been 
advocated in various forms by Woodford (2000), Goodfriend 
(2002), Lacker (2006), and Whitesell (2006b). A particular type 
of floor system has recently been adopted by the Reserve Bank 
of New Zealand. 
4.1 The Floor System
Starting from the symmetric channel system presented 
in Exhibit 2, suppose that the central bank makes two 
The issues created by the reserve tax are 
sometimes described as a “hot potato” 
problem. Participants all try to get rid of 
excess reserves because holding them 
is costly. However, the supply of excess 
reserve balances is fixed by the central 
bank and, at any point in time, someone 
must be holding them.
A central bank’s payments policy, liquidity 
policy, and desire to promote efficient 
allocation may all come into conflict 
with its monetary policy objectives. 
The tension created by these conflicts 
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modifications. First, the deposit rate is set equal to the target 
rate, instead of below it. In other words, in this system the 
central bank targets the floor of the channel, rather than some 
point in the interior. Second, the reserve supply is chosen so 
that it intersects the flat part of the demand curve generated 
by the deposit rate (Exhibit 3), rather than intersecting the 
downward-sloping part of the curve. Supply and demand will 
then cross exactly at the target rate, as desired.15
The key feature of this system is immediately apparent in 
the exhibit: the equilibrium interest rate no longer depends on 
the exact quantity of reserve balances supplied. Any quantity 
that is large enough to fall on the flat portion of the demand 
curve will implement the target rate. In this way, a floor system 
“divorces” the quantity of money from the interest rate target 
and, hence, from monetary policy. This divorce gives the 
central bank two separate policy instruments: the interest rate 
target can be set according to the usual monetary policy 
concerns, while the quantity of reserves can be set 
independently.
If the quantity of reserves is no longer determined by 
monetary policy concerns, how should it be set? In general, the 
supply of overnight reserve balances could be used to ease any 
of the tensions described earlier. For example, Lacker (2006) 
suggests that increasing the supply of overnight reserves could 
reduce banks’ use of daylight credit without impairing their 
ability to make timely payments. In fact, he argues that if 
15 The fact that these supply and demand curves cross at the target rate does not 
imply that trades in the interbank market would occur at exactly this rate. A 
bank would require a small premium, reflecting transaction costs and perhaps 
credit risk, in order to be willing to lend funds rather than simply hold them as 
(interest-bearing) reserves. As a result, the measured interest rate in the 
interbank market would generally be slightly above the deposit rate. The target 
rate could instead be called the policy rate in order to make this distinction 
clear.
overnight reserve balances are increased by the maximum 
amount of current daylight credit use, then “in principle, any 
pattern of intraday payments that is feasible under the current 
policy would still be feasible” even in the extreme case where 
access to daylight credit is eliminated altogether. Note that 
restricting access to daylight credit will tend to increase the 
demand for overnight reserves, shifting the curve in Exhibit 3 
to the right. The proposal in Lacker (2006) thus calls for 
increasing the supply of reserves enough to ensure that it falls 
on the flat portion of the demand curve even after this shift is 
taken into account.16 
Goodfriend (2002) takes a different view, proposing that 
the supply of reserve balances could be used to stabilize 
financial markets. The central bank could, for example, 
“increase bank reserves in response to a negative shock to 
broad liquidity in banking or securities markets or an increase 
in the external finance premium that elevated spreads in credit 
markets” (p. 4). More generally, he suggests that the supply of 
reserves could be set to provide the optimal quantity of broad 
liquidity services.17 It should be noted that there may be 
complementarity between payments policy and liquidity policy 
with respect to reserve balances; increasing the reserve supply 
to support broad liquidity can simultaneously reduce the use 
of daylight overdrafts, which might be particularly desirable 
during times of market turmoil.
The floor system also promotes a more efficient allocation 
of resources. Not only does this approach eliminate the reserve 
tax, it also removes the opportunity cost of holding excess 
16 See Ennis and Weinberg (2007) for a formal analysis of the relationship 
between daylight credit and monetary policy implementation, including the 
ability of a floor system to reduce daylight credit usage.
17 Determining this optimal quantity is a nontrivial task, however, and would 
likely require more research on the notion of broad liquidity and its role in the 
macroeconomy. The quantitative easing policy in place in Japan from 2001 to 
2006 can be viewed as an attempt to use the supply of bank reserves to influence 
macroeconomic outcomes.
A floor system “divorces” the quantity of 
money from the interest rate target and, 
hence, from monetary policy. This divorce 
gives the central bank two separate policy 
instruments: the interest rate target can be 
set according to the usual monetary policy 
concerns, while the quantity of reserves 
can be set independently.
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reserve balances. This is true for any quantity of reserve 
balances large enough to lie on the flat portion of the demand 
curve in Exhibit 3. At such points, banks are indifferent at the 
margin between reserves and other risk-free assets. As a result, 
they no longer have an incentive to invest real resources in 
order to economize on their reserve holdings, and the 
deadweight loss associated with the systems described in 
Section 3 disappears.
Woodford (2000) points to another advantage of the floor 
system. Suppose that innovation in financial markets were to 
undermine the demand for reserve balances that is at the heart 
of our model in Section 2. In particular, suppose that a perfect 
substitute for central bank reserves were developed and that 
banks were able to avoid reserve requirements completely. In 
such a situation, the demand for reserves would fall to zero if 
there were any opportunity cost of holding them; banks would 
instead use the substitute private instrument for payment and 
other liquidity purposes. If the central bank supplied a positive 
quantity of reserves, under the current system in the United 
States the market interest rate would fall to zero.
Woodford argues that even in this extreme situation, the 
central bank can still implement its target interest rate by using 
a floor system. Banks would again demand zero reserves at 
any interest rate higher than the target rate in this situation. 
However, under a floor system, the demand curve would be flat 
at the target rate for exactly the same reasons as described 
above. By setting a positive supply of reserves, therefore, the 
central bank could still drive the market interest rate to the 
target value. In this way, a floor system would enable the 
central bank to meet its monetary policy objectives even if 
technological changes eliminated the special role currently 
played by reserves; the key once again is divorcing money 
from monetary policy.
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand recently became the first 
central bank to implement a floor system (Box 2). While it is 
too early to evaluate the effects of this change properly, some 
benefits—such as improved timeliness of payments—have 
already been observed. To be sure, the experience of a smaller 
country like New Zealand with this type of system may not be 
directly applicable to other central banks. Nevertheless, it will 
be instructive to observe this experience and, in particular, to 
see how it compares with the simple framework we present.
 4.2  Discussion
While a floor system could potentially relieve or even eliminate 
the tensions between central bank objectives, there are several 
important concerns about how such a system would operate 
in practice and its potential effects on financial markets. One 
concern is that a floor system would likely lead to a substantial 
reduction in activity in the overnight interbank market, as 
banks would have less need to target their reserve balance 
precisely on a daily basis. In particular, since banks with excess 
funds can earn the target rate by simply depositing them with 
the central bank, the incentive to lend these funds is lower than 
it is under the other approaches to implementation discussed 
above. Nevertheless, an interbank market would still be 
necessary, as institutions will occasionally find themselves 
short of funds. How difficult it would be for institutions to 
borrow at or near the target rate is an important open question.
In addition, some observers argue that the presence of an 
active overnight market generates valuable information and 
that some of this information would be lost if market activity 
declined. For example, market participants must monitor the 
creditworthiness of borrowers. If the overnight market were 
substantially less active, such monitoring may not take place on 
a regular basis; this in turn could make borrowing even harder 
for a bank that finds itself short of funds. Such monitoring may 
also play a socially valuable role in exposing banks to market 
discipline. It is important to bear in mind, however, that the 
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In July 2006, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) began 
the transition from a symmetric channel system of monetary policy 
implementation to a floor system. We describe some reasons for 
the change and some features of the new regime, drawing heavily 
on Nield (2006) and Nield and Groom (2008).
From 1999 to 2006, the RBNZ operated a symmetric channel 
system with zero reserve requirements. It targeted a supply of NZD 
20 million overnight reserve balances every day. All reserve 
balances were remunerated at a rate 25 basis points below the 
RBNZ’s target interest rate, called the official cash rate (OCR). 
Payments system participants could borrow reserves overnight 
against collateral at the overnight reserve repurchase facility 
(ORRF), at a rate 25 basis points above the OCR. Finally, 
participants could obtain reserves intraday, against collateral, 
at an interest rate of zero using a facility called Autorepo.
The RBNZ’s decision to change the framework for monetary 
policy implementation followed signs of stress in the money 
market. The Government of New Zealand had been running a 
fiscal surplus for a number of years and government bonds had 
become increasingly scarce. The scarcity of government securities 
available to pledge in the Autorepo facility led to delayed payments 
between market participants. For the same reason, there had been 
an increase in the levels of underbid open market operations 
and, consequently, in the use of the bank’s standing facilities at the 
end of the day. Finally, the implied New Zealand dollar interest 
rates on overnight credit in the foreign exchange (FX) swap 
market—the primary market by which banks in New Zealand 
traded overnight—were volatile and often significantly above 
the target rate desired to implement monetary policy.
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand conducted a review of its 
liquidity management regime in 2005 and announced the new 
system in early 2006. Under this system, the RBNZ no longer 
offers daylight credit. In other words, there is no distinction 
between daylight and overnight reserves. The target supply of 
reserves has been vastly increased to allow for the smooth 
operation of the payments system; the new level currently 
fluctuates around NZD 8 billion. This represents an increase of 
400 times the level under the previous regime. Reserves are now 
remunerated at the OCR. It is still possible to obtain overnight 
funds at the ORRF, but at a rate 50 basis points above the OCR. 
The bulk of the transition to this new system occurred in four 
steps over a twelve-week period between July 3 and October 5, 
2006. During that time, the target supply of reserves increased 
gradually to its current level. At each step, the rate earned on 
reserves and the rate at which funds could be borrowed at the 
ORRF were increased relative to the OCR in increments of 5 basis 
points up to their current levels. The set of securities eligible as 
collateral for Autorepo was reduced until the facility was 
discontinued on October 5. 
Since the new framework was introduced, the RBNZ has 
implemented two changes. First, banks are now allowed to use a wider 
set of assets to raise cash from the central bank. In particular, a limited 
amount of AAA-rated paper is eligible.a Second, a tiered system of 
remuneration was introduced in response to episodes in which the 
market interest rate rose substantially above the OCR. The RBNZ now 
estimates the quantity of reserves a bank needs for its payment activity 
and, based on this estimate, sets a limit on the quantity that will be 
remunerated at the OCR. Any reserves held in excess of that limit earn 
a rate 100 basis points below the OCR. This policy is designed to 
provide an incentive for banks to recirculate excess reserve positions 
and to prevent them from “hoarding” reserves.
In principle, the RBNZ could have addressed this problem by 
increasing its supply of reserves instead of by implementing a 
tiered system. If the market interest rate is significantly higher than 
the policy rate in a floor system, increasing the supply of reserves 
should drive the market rate down (see Exhibit 3 in the text). 
However, the RBNZ uses FX swaps to increase the supply of 
reserves, and it found that the price in this market was moving 
against it; the more reserves the RBNZ created, the more costly 
it became to create those reserves. It is worth noting that this 
problem would not arise in a country with a large supply of 
government bonds or with a central bank that can issue its own 
interest-bearing liabilities. In such cases, increasing the supply of 
reserves need not be costly and could be an attractive alternative 
to a tiered system.
While it is too early to evaluate with great confidence all of the 
effects of the RBNZ’s changes, it appears that the transition went 
smoothly overall. There were, of course, occasional signs of stress 
in money markets, mostly attributable to the learning process 
experienced by the Bank and its payments system participants. 
There are, however, definite positive signs that the liquidity of the 
interbank market has improved. Notably, payments have been 
settling significantly earlier since the transition began, suggesting a 
reduction in the constraints previously attributable to the scarcity 
of collateral available to pledge in the Autorepo facility. In 
addition, the implied New Zealand dollar interest rates in the FX 
swap market are now much less volatile and are well within the 
50 basis point band between the official cash rate and the ORRF. 
Finally, the RBNZ conducts open market operations much less 
frequently, and the operations are no longer subject to the 
underbidding that had led to excessive use of overnight facilities. 
a See the Reserve Bank of New Zealand’s May 2008 Financial Stability 
Report for more details.
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market for overnight loans of reserves differs from other 
markets in fundamental ways. As we discussed, reserves are not 
a commodity that is physically scarce; they can be costlessly 
produced by the central bank from other risk-free assets. 
Moreover, there is no role for socially useful price discovery 
in this market, because the central bank’s objective is to set a 
particular price. Weighing the costs and benefits of a reduction 
in market activity is therefore a nontrivial task and an 
important area for future research.
If desired, the floor system could be modified in ways that 
encourage higher levels of activity in the overnight interbank 
market. For example, the central bank could limit the quantity 
of reserves on which each bank earns the target rate of interest 
and compensate balances above this limit at a lower rate. Such 
limits would encourage banks that accumulate unusually large 
balances over the course of the day to lend them out. By setting 
lower limits, the central bank would encourage more activity 
in the interbank market while marginally increasing the 
distortions discussed above.18 Whitesell (2006b) presents a 
system in which banks are allowed to determine their own 
limits by paying a “capacity fee” proportional to the chosen 
limit. In this case, the central bank would set the fee schedule in 
a way that balances concerns about the level of market activity 
with the resulting level of distortions.
Another interesting issue is the extent to which a floor 
system would allow the central bank to restrict access to 
daylight credit, if it so desired. If access to daylight credit is 
substantially restricted or removed, the smooth functioning of 
the payments system may require banks to acquire funds in the 
market on a timely basis during the day. In principle, this could 
be accomplished by the development of either an intraday 
market for reserve balances or a market for precise time-of-day 
delivery of reserves (see McAndrews [2006] for a discussion 
of such possibilities). Whether such markets would actually 
18 Ennis and Keister (2008) describe a related approach based on “clearing 
bands,” where banks face a minimum requirement and earn the target rate of 
interest on balances held up to a higher limit. This approach could be used to 
encourage activity in the interbank market on the borrowing side (by banks 
that find themselves below the minimum requirement) as well as on the 
lending side (by banks that find themselves above the higher limit).
develop and how efficiently they would operate are important 
open questions. 
Going forward, the experience of New Zealand’s floor 
system will provide valuable information on these issues and 
others that might arise. However, the differences between the 
financial system of New Zealand and those of economies 
like the United States will make it difficult to draw definite 
conclusions. For this reason, it is important to employ the 
tools of modern economic theory to develop models that are 
capable of addressing these issues.
5.C o n c l u s i o n
This article highlights the important similarities in the 
monetary policy implementation systems used by many central 
banks. In these systems, there is a tight link between money and 
monetary policy because the supply of reserve balances must be 
set precisely in order to implement the target interest rate. This 
link creates tensions with the central bank’s other objectives. 
For example, the intraday need for reserves for payment 
purposes is much higher than the overnight demand, which has 
led central banks to provide low-cost intraday loans of reserves 
to participants in their payments systems. This activity exposes 
the central bank to credit risk and may generate problems 
of moral hazard. The link also prevents central banks from 
increasing the supply of reserves to promote market liquidity in 
times of financial stress without compromising their monetary 
policy objectives. Furthermore, the link relies on banks facing 
an opportunity cost of holding reserves, which generates 
deadweight losses and hinders the efficient allocation of 
resources.
Our study also presents an approach to implementing 
monetary policy in which this link is severed, leaving the 
quantity of reserves and the interest rate target to be set 
independently. In this floor-system approach, interest is paid 
on reserve balances at the target interest rate. This policy allows 
the central bank to increase the supply of reserves, perhaps even 
significantly, without affecting the short-term interest rate. 
While the floor system has received a fair amount of attention 
in policy circles recently, there are important open questions 
about how well such a system will work in practice. Going 
forward, it will be useful to develop theoretical models of the 
monetary policy implementation process that can address 
these questions, as well as to observe New Zealand’s experience 
with the floor system it implemented in 2006.
If desired, the floor system could be 
modified in ways that encourage higher 
levels of activity in the overnight 
interbank market.References
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